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Structuralist Neologicism
Francesca Boccuni, Jack Woods∗
Abstract
Neofregeanism and structuralism are among the most promising
recent approaches to the philosophy of mathematics. Yet both have
serious costs. We develop a view, structuralist neologicism, which re-
tains the central advantages of each while avoiding their more serious
costs. The key to our approach is using arbitrary reference to ex-
plicate how mathematical terms, introduced by abstraction principles
like Hume’s, refer. Focusing on numerical terms, we argue that this
allows us to treat abstraction principles as implicit definitions serving
to determine all (known) properties of the numbers, achieving a key
neofregean advantage, while preserving the key structuralist advantage
that which objects play the number role doesn’t matter.
1 Overview
Neofregeanism and structuralism about mathematical objects both vindi-
cate many intuitions about the mathematical domain. Among the most
attractive are:
∗Thanks to Bahram Assadian, John Divers, Volker Halbach, Simon Hewitt, Dan Isaac-
son, James Ladyman, Øystein Linnebo, Beau Madison Mount, Marco Panza, Andrea
Sereni, Robbie Williams, the participants in several conferences previous drafts of this
article were presented at, and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments. Thanks
especially to the sadly departed Aldo Antonelli who introduced us and inspired this piece.
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(1) mathematical objects are the referents of syntactically singular terms;
(2) truths about them are conceptual truths;
(3) the only properties they have are mathematical properties.
While the neofregean wants to vindicate (1) and (2), the structuralist aims
at vindicating (1) and (3).1 Yet these intuitions often conflict in prac-
tice, tempting neofregeans and structuralists into controversial commitments
which weaken the initial attractiveness of their views.
In light of this, it’s inevitable that someone would synthesize these views
in an attempt to salvage all three intuitions. We bravely volunteer to take on
this role. Structuralist neologicism, the view we develop here, can seamlessly
satisfy these desiderata. All that’s needed is a bit of ideology—which we
assure you is a reasonable cost.
We start by exploring a serious problem for the neofregean approach, the
Caesar problem.2 Neofregeans treat syntactically singular terms introduced
by abstraction as functioning semantically like proper names. But this re-
quires abstraction principles to single out particular referents. The Caesar
problem—hume’s principle’s silence on the question of whether numbers
are Roman emperors—shows that there’s no simple route to paradigmatic
reference for the neofregean, which threatens (1).
The problem can be resolved, but only at significant cost. In particular,
we can invert the Caesar problem to show that any solution to it conflicts
with the privileged epistemic status of abstraction principles, threatening
(2). If the Caesar problem is solved, then hp implies truths about non-
mathematical objects, which is an unwelcome feature for an allegedly ana-
lytic or logical principle such as hp. This in turn jeopardizes (3). See §3
below for details.
1The ante rem structuralist, anyways. In re structuralism abandons (1). We discuss
both these structuralist views in §4 below.
2The Caesar problem originates with Frege’s Grundlagen der Arithmetik, §66. See e.g.
Wright [1983] and Hale and Wright [2001] for discussion in the neofregean context.
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For structuralists, mathematical objects like natural numbers are picked
out by their roles within the natural number structure. Correspondingly, in
order for numerals to refer in the usual way, appropriate individuals need
to be so specified for each. As abstract structures have many realizations,
the only way to do this treats structures as self-subsisting objects which our
mathematical terms latch onto. Yet some mathematical terms, like i, cannot
be so treated. Structuralism thus struggles to rescue the intuition that all
syntactically singular terms of mathematics are semantically singular even
granting the existence of abstract structures. See §4 for details.
Our view, structuralist neologicism, avoids both problems by interpreting
mathematical singular terms in terms of arbitrary reference. Mathematical
singular terms, as devices of arbitrary reference, function in all essential ways
as singular terms; they are devices of genuine, if non-standard, singular
reference.3 So interpreting mathematical singular terms thus permits us
to view abstraction principles like Hume’s as sufficiently individuating of
mathematical objects as to secure reference, satisfying (1).4
Moreover, our arbitrary interpretation of number-terms treats certain
abstraction principles as both implicit definitions and a type of logical truth,
vindicating a strong form of (2), the neofregean insight that abstraction
principles like hp have privileged epistemic status. Yet we treat only the
arithmetical properties—those following from facts about the equivalence
relation of equinumerosity—as properties of the numbers, retaining (3), the
central insight of the structuralist program.5
3Fine [1998, 2002] also suggests indeterminate or variable interpretations of mathemat-
ical objects—especially those induced by abstraction. His account differs from ours, but
it’s clearly in the same spirit.
4We discuss the genuine referentiality of arbitrary terms introduced by hume’s prin-
ciple in §6.
5For an important caveat, see fn. 27 below.
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2 Abstraction Principles
Neofregeans ground mathematical concepts in abstraction principles. These
are principles of the form:
§e1 = §e2 ↔ E(e1, e2)
where § is an operator mapping some entities e1, e2 into entities of a (possi-
bly) different sort, and E is an equivalence relation holding between e1, e2.
Roughly, they say that the abstract of e1 is identical with the abstract of
e2 just in case e1 and e2 stand in the equivalence relation E. The idea is to
“transfer”, in some sense, the content expressed by the equivalence relation
on the right to the complex syntactically singular terms flanking the identity
sign on the left.
Abstraction principles originate with Frege, who singled out three of
particular interest:
(1) hume’s principle: #F = #G ↔ F ≈ G
which says that the number of the Fs and the Gs are identical iff the
Fs and the Gs are in one-to-one correspondence.6
(2) basic law v: {x : Fx} = {x : Gx} ↔ ∀x(Fx ↔ Gx)
which says that the extensions of the concepts F and G are identical
iff F and G are co-extensive.7
(3) direction principle: d(a) = d(b) ↔ a//b
which says that the directions of line a and b are identical iff a is
parallel to b.8
Of these, hume’s principle (hp) has been the focus of significant inter-
est since it interprets full second-order Peano arithmetic and, unlike basic
6See Frege’s Grundlagen der Arithmetik, §62 and Mancosu [2015] for a survey of early
principles about equality of numerosities.
7See Frege’s Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, vol. I §20.
8See Frege’s Grundlagen der Arithmetik, §65.
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law v, it’s consistent. Neofregeans have also pointed out that hp looks
conceptually true of cardinality (or, alternatively, implicitly definitional of
cardinal number).9 Moreover, they claim on the basis of the syntactic
priority thesis:
syntactic priority: The truth of claims involving numerical
terms in singular term position suffices to guarantee that they
refer to objects. [Wright 1983]
that hp, being true, not only specifies our conception of cardinal number,
but guarantees the existence of cardinals as the referents of expressions like
‘#F ’. How, though, is this supposed to work?
2.1 Individuation, Abstraction, and Caesar
The answer is that abstraction principles are supposed to provide identity
criteria for individuating abstract objects. Then the identity and distinctness
claims on the left-hand side of abstraction principles let us identify which
objects ‘#F’ refers to, wherever it appears [Linnebo 2009]. This is a nice
start, but what’s meant by individuation isn’t obvious. We see two possible
disambiguations.
First, there’s a metaphysical interpretation of individuation: ‘whatever
it is that makes [an object] the single object that it is’ [Lowe 2003, p. 75].
Second, there’s an epistemic interpretation where we ‘single out’ an entity as
a ‘distinct object of perception, thought, or linguistic reference’ (op cit.). So
abstraction principles individuate either by singling out objects (the epis-
temic interpretation) or by making them the sort of object that they are
(the metaphysical interpretation).
But abstraction principles are far from perfect individuators on either
interpretation. This is the basis of the Caesar problem, one of the most
9The claimed epistemic status of hp has shifted over the years in light of criticism by
Boolos [1998] and others.
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difficult issues for neofregeans.10 The problem is that hp doesn’t decide the
truth value of “mixed” identity statements like:
#F = Caesar
However, it’s basic to our understanding of cardinal numbers that they don’t
conquer Gaul, much less do so with Caesarian aplomb. Of course, hp entails
#F = #G when F and G are equinumerous and #F 6= #G when they’re
not. But, as Frege complained, hp doesn’t tell us whether the number 2 is
or isn’t a Roman conqueror.
Many, including us, think that hp should deliver some such verdict on
mixed identities:
If [Frege’s] platonist conception [of numbers as self-subsistent
objects] is to be legitimate, there surely have to be facts of the
matter about which objects the numbers are. The concept of
number must possess ‘sharp limits to its application’ — it can-
not just be indeterminate whether the putative referents of the
terms which hume’s principle enables us to introduce coin-
cide with any previously understood or independently intelligi-
ble kind of objects. Hence if there really are such referents, a
satisfactory conception of the objects in question must somehow
implicitly settle whether they are or are not trees, tigers, persons
or countries. [Hale and Wright, 2001, p. 341].
More generally, as Frege noted, solving the Caesar problem is crucial to the
epistemological grounds of his project:
If we are to use a symbol ‘a’ to signify an object, we must
have a criterion for deciding in all cases whether b is the same
as a (. . . ). [emphasis ours] (Grundlagen der Arithmetik §62)
10See Tennant, Neil [2013], Logicism and Neologicism, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philos-
ophy for useful survey of other extant issues.
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It’s similarly crucial for neofregeans. hp is supposed to provide epistemic
access to cardinal numbers, but in so doing, it should capture what cardinal
numbers intrinsically are and aren’t and regurgitate things we know about
numbers like their ineligibility to rule.
If the Caesar problem isn’t solvable, we should admit that hp fails both
to settle the intrinsic nature of numbers as well as failing to explain how we
single them out. Correspondingly, it neither epistemically individuates the
numbers from other objects nor metaphysically individuates them. We thus
claim that hp fails to secure reference to the numbers exactly because fixing
of reference, as standardly understood, presupposes individuation. Since the
relationship between reference and individuation is essential to our criticism
of neofregeanism, we’ll dwell a bit on it in the next section.11
2.2 What’s Really Wrong with Caesar?
First a caveat: we aren’t concerned with the semantic notion of reference
found in a representational semantics, but rather the metasemantic expla-
nation of how reference by singular terms can be achieved at all. Standard
metasemantic accounts of reference, like those proposed for proper names
in natural language, presuppose individuation of the referent from other al-
ternatives in order to fix reference. Here are three rather central examples
(the point holds generally):
• Causal chain theories require initial tagging of an object by ostension,
when the baptism takes place in præsentia, otherwise by description.
[Kripke, 1980, p. 96, fn. 42.] Securing a referent thus requires that
some object be singled out, by description or ostension, from the salient
alternatives.
• Descriptivist theories fix the reference of proper names via definite
11We think these considerations undermine also Hale and Wright [2001]’s solution to
the Caesar problem. See §3.1 below.
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descriptions. The entire function of the descriptive material is to single
out an unique object as the referent of a singular term.
• Radical Interpretation accounts fix reference via a procedure of assign-
ing the most reasonable referent from among the salient alternatives.
This requires prior ability to individuate the potential assignees.
Fixing the referents of ordinary singular terms involves, in one way or an-
other, singling out unique referents. Since the referent needs to be unique,
we can call this perfect individuation:
perfect individuation An individual i is perfectly individuated just in
case it’s uniquely singled out, in some way, from among candidate
referents for i.
We’ll call the form of reference fixed via perfect individuation canonical
reference:
canonical reference A singular term ‘t’ refers canonically just in case
the referent of t is perfectly individuated.
Abstraction terms like ‘#F ’ are supposed to refer analogously to ordinary
singular terms. It thus seems reasonable to require that abstraction princi-
ples explain how terms like ‘#F ’ canonically refer—which seems to require
perfect individuation. Or, anyways, this seems reasonable unless there’s an
alternative form of reference on offer.
Yet the Caesar problem shows that certain abstraction principles fail
to perfectly individuate their abstracts from other objects. As canonical
reference requires perfect individuation, the problem spreads to a failure to
provide canonical referents. Of course, when we can’t single out a unique
referent just by something like hp, we might let some outside criterion fill the
gap. For instance, we might use the relative naturalness—in Lewis’s sense—
of salient objects to decide which lucky one is referred to by ‘#F ’. Some
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interpretativist views likewise treat being the most reasonable referent as
an external factual matter—not necessarily something available to someone
actually interpreting.
But this patch, however attractive elsewhere, looks problematic here.
Why would any of many possible referents of #F be more “natural” or rea-
sonable than any other? In cases of reference to concrete objects, it some-
times seems reasonable to let external criteria partially determine what we
refer to. But reference to mathematical objects by abstraction seems differ-
ent. If our attempted conceptual analysis or implicit definition of cardinal
number doesn’t single out a particular object for ‘#F ’ to refer to, what
materials external to our definition could reasonably close the gap?12
The obvious move is invoking pre-existing substantive knowledge of the
nature of numbers to more finely individuate potential referents. But then
it’s hp and whatever background materials are so invoked which succeed at
securing canonical reference, not merely hp, contra neofregeanism. And this
suggests another worry.
3 Inverting Caesar: The Raseac Problem
We don’t believe the Caesar problem can be solved satisfyingly without
abandoning canonical reference. But, even if we’re wrong, solving it requires
giving up on (2), that hp has a privileged epistemic status. Why? Because
in showing that hp determines that 2 isn’t a Roman, we’d learn something
about the nature of both numbers and Roman generals. If hp entails that
‘#F ’, for any F , isn’t Caesar, it also entails Caesar isn’t a number. But
hp’s supposed to be some form of logical or conceptual truth and these
12We don’t deny the world might sometimes help secure canonical reference—consider
analytic functionalism about mental properties. Our point, rather, is that the world seems
unable to play that role for the case of ‘#F ’. In a way, this is the real lesson of Benac-
erraf [1965]—extra-arithmetical properties distinguishing between potential referents of
numerals simply seem irrelevant to their role, so choosing which is referred to on this basis
seems, at absolute best, ad hoc. Thanks to John Divers for discussion.
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aren’t supposed to inform us about the underlying nature of the objects
they applied to. Especially not Romans.
These intuitions are nowadays explicated in terms of topic-neutrality.
This is represented formally in terms of invariance of the meaning of log-
ical terms under operations like permuting the domain.13 Variance of the
meaning of an expression under a permutation demonstrates that it:
somehow discriminate[s] among individuals in the domain, and
any consideration which discriminates among individuals lies be-
yond the reach of logic, whose concerns are entirely general.
[McGee, 1996, p. 567].
Permutation invariance is widely accepted as a necessary condition on
logicality; it’s underlying motivation, that logical, conceptual, and defini-
tional truths shouldn’t have substantive implications for the underlying ob-
jects they apply to is accepted even more widely. These “special” sorts of
claims shouldn’t convey meaning on an expression where that meaning car-
ries substantive individual discriminating content.14 Yet if we can solve the
Caesar problem, we can show that #F isn’t Caesar, clearly discriminating
between the two. In short, solving the Caesar problem seems to undermine
the claim that hp is a conceptual, logical, or definitional truth.
Limited attention has been paid to this problem. Three distinct invari-
ance relations on abstraction principles have been investigated: invariance
of the equivalence relation; invariance of the abstraction principle itself; and
invariance of the induced abstraction operator [Antonelli 2010]. The liter-
ature on how invariance relates to abstraction, such as the work of Fine
[2002], Cook [2016], and Antonelli [2010], has focused on invariance of the
equivalence relation on the righthand side of abstraction principles. The
details of this notion of invariance and invariance of abstraction principles
themselves won’t concern us here given our focus on singular terms.
13The Raseac Problem is novel to us, but inspired by Antonelli [2010].
14Of course, we could debate what ‘substantive’ implications are. Here, we won’t.
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For our purposes, the important type is the third. An abstraction op-
erator § is invariant in this sense just in case §(π(X)) = π(§(X)) for any
permutation π of the underlying domain. This type of invariance for ab-
straction operators hasn’t been seriously investigated since it looks nearly
trivial. #, standardly understood, has the semantic type of a function from
subsets of the domain into the domain; any object of that semantic type is
invariant only on domains containing a single object.
#, as standardly understood, isn’t permutation invariant and thus fails
the most widely accepted and plausible necessary condition on logicality.15
But, if ‘#’, with the meaning conveyed on it by hp, fails a widely accepted
criterion for being a logical operation, how could hp be a logical or con-
ceptual truth? It’s a worrying feature of a logical or conceptual truth if
its function is to generate operations which are themselves non-logical. At
best, the resulting claim that hp is a logical, conceptual, or definitional truth
would be much weakened. So solving Caesar seems to undermine one of the
central motivations for the neofregean program.
To drive this point home, suppose we can know, by means of hp and
additional materials, that, no matter what F is, #F 6= Caesar. We can al-
ways find a permutation π of the actual domain where π(#F ) = Caesar.16
If # were permutation invariant, then #(π(F )) = π(#(F )) = Caesar, con-
tradicting our assumption. So any interpretation of # which solved Caesar
would eo ipso be permutation variant, violating a necessary condition on
logicality, and thus run straight into the Raseac problem.
3.1 Hale and Wright on Caesar
Hale and Wright [2001] appeal to a theory of categories to respond to the
Caesar problem. Their approach demands discussion since it also potentially
15On permutation invariance as a necessary condition on logicality, see e.g. McGee
[1996]. See also the authors mentioned in §7 below.
16Obviously we’re assuming Caesar is in our actual domain. If you’re feeling pedantic,
rerun the example with your favorite personality.
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skirts the Raseac problem. A category can be understood as a collection of
objects which share a common identity criterion—e.g. abstract object, per-
son, etc. Categories are distinguished by the identity criteria associated with
objects falling under them. The identity criterion given by hp, for instance,
is distinct from identity criterion for persons, whatever that is. Persons and
numbers are supposed to essentially belong to different categories; on this
basis, Hale and Wright claim cross-category identity claims are uniformly
false. While both of us agree that that ‘Caesar isn’t #F ’ is conceptually
flawed, we believe our view has some significant advantages.
For example, consider cross-category claims like #F 6= Caesar and al-
leged intra-category claims like ‘the natural number 2 = the real number
2’. The essence of Hale and Wright solution is that the sortal concepts for
persons and numbers don’t share an identity criterion. But the most plausi-
ble explanation of this difference in identity conditions invokes the fact that
numbers and persons have different intrinsic properties.
It seems to us that the intrinsic properties of numbers should be de-
termined by hp. But since hp doesn’t settle the Caesar non-identity, how
can we explain the difference in identity conditions which settles the Caesar
non-identity? We worry that solving Caesar Hale and Wright’s way demands
that hp already provide necessary and sufficient conditions for distinguishing
cardinal numbers from humans. This, though, is what invoking categories
was supposed to accomplish for us.17
Of course, Hale and Wright could just stipulate hp as the identity crite-
rion for cardinal numbers. But this also stumbles on inter-category claims.
Both the natural number 2n and the real number 2r are abstract objects, so
they should share a common identity criterion. If this is right, what stops
us from also saying that both 2n and Caesar are both things, so they should
share a common identity criterion, so the Caesar problem still isn’t resolved?
17See Stirton [2017] for a similar worry: Hale and Wright’s solution hinges on the idea
that it is not a conceptual necessity that number and person share a common identity
criterion. This seems to hinge on already understanding the mixed identity statements.
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Suppose that 2n and 2r don’t share an identity condition. Then they are
of different categories and so 2n 6= 2r. But we think that it’s problematic
to say there’s a determinate answer—false!—to whether or not they’re iden-
tical. This can be emphasized by noticing that similar moves would mean
that the cardinals and the finite cardinals aren’t identical either [Linnebo
forthcoming].18
Finally, Hale and Wright could claim that cross-category identifications
simply don’t make sense, but this overgenerates. It’s determinately true
that we’re not the same as the proof that there’s no largest prime. But
presumably the relevant identity conditions are distinct. Likewise the co-
authoring duo Francesca and Jack isn’t the same as either member; but
again, presumably the relevant identity criteria are different. Far better to
solve Caesar our way by maintaining there’s simply no determinate answer
to certain mixed identity claims.
4 Structuralism – Two Types
Structuralist views also abandon at least one of our opening intuitions. In
their foundationalist guise, these views comes in two main varieties differ-
ing in how they treat presumptive mathematical singular terms. Ante rem
structuralism [Shapiro 1997, Resnik 1997], holds that mathematical singular
terms canonically refer to positions in structures where structures themselves
are treated as abstracta. In re structuralism [Chihara 2004, Hellman 1989]
contextually eliminates mathematical singular terms in favor of modal gener-
alizations over instantiated structures. Our worries about each are different,
so we take them in turn.
18This argument presumes Hale and Wright’s Grundgedanke (which is essential to their
solution to Caesar): any object has a single associated criterion of identity. See Fine [2002,
pp. 48-49] and Linnebo [forthcoming, §9] for worries about it.
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4.1 Structuralism – Ante rem
Ante rem structuralists treat singular terms as referring canonically. Since
they are devices of canonical reference, they need to pick out objects. Since
there’s no principled choice of set, etc. which can be reasonably taken to
be the number 2, we need an object to be the canonical referent of the nu-
meral ‘2’. Individual mathematical objects are “places in structures”, where
structures are abstract objects and isomorphic structures are identified.
Since there’s only one natural number structure, there’s just one candi-
date place in the structure to assign to ‘2’, so there’s a unique number 2.
There are ways to push Benacerrafian worries about the intuitiveness of this
solution and metaphysical worries about existence of structures themselves,
but we’ll mainly put these aside since there are problems more related to
our present concerns.
Structural properties and relations are supposed to fully constitute po-
sitions in structures. But we can’t distinguish, using just these properties
and relations, between certain positions in structures admitting non-trivial
automorphisms (like the complex numbers) [Shapiro 1997, Burgess 1999,
Keränen 2001]. Shapiro [2008, 2012] solves this by assuming that expressions
aimed at indiscernable positions, like ‘i’ and ‘−i’, are treated as parameters:
as not genuinely referential but only contextually so. They’re assigned in
a context to an arbitrary referent and canonically refer, in that context, to
that referent. For Shapiro, the relevant context continues forward through-
out our mathematical practice.
We like arbitrary reference, but Shapiro’s solution puzzlingly imposes
a double standard for reference via mathematical singular terms. Some
singular terms genuinely refer, analogously to ordinary referential terms,
some other do so only in specific contexts. So, in order to solve the particular
issue indiscernibles poses for ante rem structuralism, Shapiro abandons the
idea that all mathematical terms uniformly and canonically refer, seemingly
14
undermining a key advantage of ante rem structuralism.19 It would be better
if this kind of disjunctive solution could be avoided since there’s no surface
difference between the grammar of i and 2. Indeed, why not just go all
the way with arbitrary reference, treating it as a genuine form of reference,
as we do below? This neatly avoids the double standard by treating the
ability to uniquely refer as a relatively common special case. Once we’ve
gone arbitrary anyways, why not just go arbitrary across the board?
4.2 Structuralism – In re
In re structuralists contextually eliminate mathematical singular terms
wherever they appear, dropping intuition (1) entirely. This strategy is avail-
able, but costly. Consider a claim like ‘2 is prime’. This can be reinterpreted
á la Hellman as:
∀X(X is simply infinite→ ‘∀x x divides 2 ↔ x = 2 ∨ x = 1’
holds in X)
but the translation pinches since the surface grammar of ‘2 is prime’ mirrors
‘Guillermo is human’. Numerals seem to intuitively mean the same things
within mathematical contexts and without. Constructions like:
2 is prime, even, my favorite number, and an abstract object
are perfectly coherent and possibly true.
So in re structuralists either need to give contextual definitions of non-
mathematical claims or posit an ambiguity about numerals. Both are un-
pleasant. Better to give a uniform explanation of the meaning of numerals
instead of contextually, but not uniformly, eliminating it whenever it ap-
pears.
19See Assadian [forthcoming] and Hellman [2001] for arguments that this problem gener-
alizes, placing in doubt the ability of ante rem structuralists to capture canonical reference
at all.
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5 A Way Forward
Summing up, none of our alternatives allows us to satisfy intuitions (1)-
(3) about mathematical objects. The neofregean is caught between the
Caesar and Raseac problems: either hp doesn’t suffice for terms like ‘#F ’
to function as uniquely designating singular terms or hp has substantial
content, weakening its privileged logical, conceptual, or definitional status.
Structuralist alternatives fare no better. Ante rem structuralism cannot
capture singular reference across the board because of terms like i, in re
structuralism entirely abandons treating the syntatically singular terms of
mathematics as semantic singular terms.
Suppose, though, we can avoid the Caesar/Raseac dilemma for ne-
ofregeanism while, contra the structuralisms canvassed, salvaging the idea
that all syntactically singular terms of mathematics are semantic singular
terms.20 If we can do this by rejecting canonical reference, preserving the
benefits of otherwise attractive programs without abandoning their central
motivations, then we should seriously consider doing so. Our primary aim
in the following is showcasing the attractions of such an account.
To do so, we’ll develop an account of the reference of singular terms intro-
duced by abstraction principles which treats mathematical singular terms as
referring arbitrarily. Arbitrary reference is a genuine alternative to canonical
reference since it’s a form of genuine reference without perfect individuation.
It salvages intuition (1); this, in combination with other features of arbitrary
reference, permits a principled solution to Caesar. We provide a semantical
account of the meanings for these singular terms on which they’re permu-
tation (in fact, isomorphism) invariant. This makes it reasonable to treat
20An alternative which avoids both the Caesar problem and equivocal reference treats
hp-numbers as higher-order properties, as we might do by just ramsifying over Peano
arithmetic. This strategy though, like in re structuralist’s, doesn’t account for the surface
syntactic role that expressions such as ‘#F ’ seem to play. We also want to make our view
appealing to both the neofregean and the ante rem structuralist: to this end, we want to
retain intuition (1). Thanks to Volker Halbach for discussion.
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them, and hp itself, as logical, vindicating a strong form of intuition (2).
Thus our account solves splits the Caesar/Raseac dilemma.
The meaning of #, on our view, is indifferent to the underlying nature
of the objects it refers to. We thereby additionally capture (3), the central
insight of mathematical structuralism: anything can work to play the role
of a number, whether tables, chairs, or beer mugs. So our view unites core
features of both structuralism and neofregeanism, while abandoning much
of the neofregean metaphysical outlook, i.e. that hp perfectly individuates
abstracta. Since we treat hp as logical, we retain the logicist insight that
mathematical content can be grounded in logic. The result is thus struc-
turalist neologicism.
5.1 Structuralist Neologicism — First Pass
We believe that there’s a non-canonical notion of reference which natu-
rally interprets how singular terms introduced via abstraction refer. This
type of reference respects the intuitive syntactic structure of mathematical
expressions—conforming to the neofregean syntactic priority thesis—
without the baggage of canonical reference.
Principles like hp, which function much like implicit definitions, don’t
specify unique meanings for #. Rather, as the Caesar problem demonstrates,
they only specify a class of potential meanings. If we took hp literally as an
implicit definition, and didn’t assume any additional reference-fixing mate-
rials, we’d have two options: either treat hp as a failed implicit definition
of # (this presumes canonical reference) or treat it as a successful implicit
definition of a broader meaning for # where # refers arbitrarily over the
class of potential canonical referents.21
21Implicit definitions, even when we relax the uniqueness requirement, are supposed to
pick out the weakest possible meaning for the defined term. Since abstraction principles
can be interpreted arbitrarily and since any canonical interpretation would be stronger
than this interpretation, it violates the spirit of the implicit definition approach to so-
interpret them [Woods 2014, §4.3].
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We hold that hp lays down the exact content of number-terms and no
more: hp doesn’t say that #F isn’t Roman, so neither should we. Treating
‘#F ’ as referring arbitrarily allows us to treat the question ‘Is #F=Caesar?’
like we treat ‘Is the arbitrary triangle scalene?’. Both are terrible questions—
they fundamentally misunderstand the semantic role of arbitrarily referring
expression. The arbitrary term #F is treated as generally carrying only
those properties that are true of any arbitrary choice of canonical referent
which could play the #F -role; asking about other properties simply misun-
derstands how arbitrary reference works.22 The properties of the referent of
‘#F ’ are given by equivalence relation of equinumerosity on the right-hand
side of hp. So the meaning conferred on ‘#F ’ generally doesn’t outstrip
what’s explicable in terms of the equivalence relation of equinumerosity.23
6 Arbitrary Reference
Our move is less startling than it might appear. Several theorists have re-
cently suggested treating certain singular terms as parameters or arbitrary
names: terms behaving grammatically like singular terms, but function-
ing semantically like pronouns or indefinite descriptions. We’ve mentioned
Shapiro already [2008, 2012], but Brandom [1996], Pettigrew [2008], and
Woods [2014] have also recently suggested this approach. In mathematical
discourse these kinds of terms are typically introduced by locutions of the
form ‘Let j be an F ’, where j is thereafter treated as functioning just like a
singular term.
Pettigrew and Shapiro interpret these terms as not genuinely referen-
tial.24 We, in contrast, take arbitrary reference to be a genuine, if non-
canonical, form of singular reference. We are indifferent to whether canoni-
22The ‘generally’ here elides an issue involving what Fine calls the principle of generic
attribution. See below and fn. 27.
23For the details of our view concerning hp, see §6.4 below.
24Our view otherwise looks rather similar to theirs. We take this to be a good thing!
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cal reference is a common special case of arbitrary reference (where there’s
only one candidate meaning), though we note that there’s a certain elegance
to this view. Our view can be developed in two ways, each of which corre-
sponds to each author’s favorite way of interpreting arbitrary reference. This
is because each interpretation treats arbitrary reference as genuine reference.
6.1 Two Ways of Understanding Arbitrariness
The first way of understanding arbitrary reference is epistemicist. Roughly,
we cannot know what an arbitrary term refers to, but it refers to a unique
individual.25 We call the second way the supervaluational view: arbitrary
reference is a primitive form of reference which shouldn’t be glossed in terms
of canonical reference. We can model this kind of reference, however, in
terms of a supervaluational semantics where, generally, properties had by all
individual choice of referent are had by the arbitrary referent. On this view,
any epistemic constraint on arbitrary reference follows from the semantic
function of arbitrary terms.26
6.2 The Epistemicist View of Arbitrariness
The epistemicist view, championed by Breckenridge & Magidor [2012], Mar-
tino [2001], and Boccuni [2013], conceives of arbitrary reference as an epis-
temic phenomenon. Locutions like ‘Let n be an arbitrary natural number’
introduce reference to a particular arbitrary natural number n where, ac-
cording to Breckenridge & Magidor [2012]:
Arbitrary Reference (AR): [n] receives its ordinary kind of se-
mantic value, though we do not know and cannot know which
25The name recalls Williamson’s views on vagueness; the analogy is developed in detail
by Breckenridge & Magidor [2012].
26There’s also Fine’s [1985] view that arbitrary terms pick out a class of special “arbi-
trary individuals”. It’s generally thought too metaphysical a solution, though it’s available
as another way of developing our view.
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value in particular it receives. [Breckenridge and Magidor 2012,
p. 377].
The epistemicist view retains classical logic while still motivating the
usual restrictions imposed on the rules of introduction and elimination of
quantifiers in natural deduction. In the rule of universal introduction, for
example, to infer from φ(a) to ∀xφx, we require that no assumption the
universal quantification depends upon contains the arbitrary name a. This
is because, in order to conclude that all x are φ from φ(a), we need to ensure
that no assumption concerning specific properties of a played a role in our
concluding φ(a). This is can be naturally treated as explicit ignorance about
the particular properties of a.
6.3 The Supervaluational View
The more radical view developed by Woods [2014] suggests taking arbi-
trariness as a fundamental semantical notion. The semantic function of an
arbitrary expression doesn’t involve it referring to an object in a canonical
way. In particular, we don’t model the referential nature of ‘#F ’ by assign-
ing it a particular object in a model. Rather, an arbitrary expression refers
over the class of objects which would satisfy it if it functioned like a device
of canonical reference. We then model—though we don’t reduce—the truth
of a statement φ containing arbitrary names relative to the truth of state-
ments containing non-arbitrary names. Roughly, if every precisification of a
model assigning a particular member of the domain to the arbitrary terms
in φ agrees that φ is true, then φ is true.27
27The converse does not hold since, for certain special properties like 〈λx. x = #F 〉, #F
has it but no instantiation does. In terms of Fine’s [2002] discussion, we need a principled
restriction on the principle of generic attribution linking arbitrary to non-arbitrary objects.
There are various plausible ways of doing this—again, see Fine [2002]—but by far the
easiest notes that our reasoning concerning these objects typically needs the inference
from “the arbitrary F has φ” to “every non-arbitrary F has φ” only in those clear cases
of non-special properties. The supervaluational semantics in Woods [2014] vindicates
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This view ties the formal semantics for arbitrary reference and the se-
mantical function of arbitrary reference closely together. The properties the
arbitrary triangle has (known or not!) are only those which any particu-
lar choice of individual referent has, not properties holding only of some of
these. On the semantics sketched above claims like ‘the arbitrary triangle
is equilateral’ and ‘the arbitrary triangle is not equilateral’, which predicate
properties of the arbitrary triangle which do not hold of all triangles, come
out as neither true nor false. The supervaluational view thus reflects the
intended usage of the device of arbitrary reference into the semantics for it.
Of course, as on any supervaluational view, we have to relinquish classical
logic to obtain this advantage.
Structuralist neologicism is thus an ecumenical view, permitting several
different developments. In particular, many ways of interpreting arbitrary
reference serve adequately for developing the view. We offer the reader a
choice as we turn to providing more detail about the arbitrary interpretation
of abstraction operators.
6.4 Reading hp the Arbitrary Way
Consider again hp:(hp) #F = #G ↔ F ≈ G. One (typically unintended)
reading of it is as a type-lowering principle: lowering concepts to objects
by assigning objects, possibly even actual (pre-existing) numbers, to the
respective pieces of the cardinality partition on the powerset of the domain.
Viewed this way, hp gets too much out of what is intended to be an
implicit definition—there’s no unique assignment of objects to pieces of the
cardinality partition which satisfies hp. How then could hp manage to
pick out a particular one? Why not think that when viewed as an implicit
definition, hp picks out a class of indexings of the cardinality partition (what
Hodes [1984] calls a ‘numberer’); all the indexings that would vindicate hp
this direction for non-special properties. The generally useful converse holds without
restriction.
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if they were the determinate meaning of #?
Once we have seen that, qua implicit definition, hp really indicates only
a class of possible indexings, we open the way to treat terms like ‘#F ’
arbitrarily. Since it doesn’t matter which indexing plays the role of #, we
can treat hp as implicitly specifying an arbitrary indexing that will do the
job.28
Our essential disagreement with neofregeans is about whether hp singles
out a unique function # such that expressions like ‘#F ’ canonically refer.
How could it except by presuming, as part of our background understanding
of #, an intended range which excluded Caesars? But such presumptions
undermine the status of hp as an implicit definition of cardinal number. Re-
ally, it’s only hp plus some background presumption that specify the notion
of cardinal number.
If we read hp the arbitrary way though, we can defend the idea that hp
has a privileged status akin to an implicit definition. It fully specifies the
numberers without background presumptions while also being composed
only of logical expressions (in a sense to be specified). Moreover, unlike
other accounts, the implicitly defined functor # is itself logical (isomorphism
invariant) in the relevant sense!
7 Logicality
Arbitrary interpretations of hp look logical in a central important sense.
Along with many others (Tarski, Sher, McGee, Sagi, Woods, Griffiths and
Paseau), we take invariance under isomorphism to be a necessary, verging on
sufficient, condition of logicality.29 We’ll develop this notion briefly before
28There are ways to eliminate the use of hp as an implicit definition by means of as-
cending to a slightly more powerful logic (such as Woods [2014] suggestion that we add
an operation of primitive choice over functions)—but the implicit definition picture of hp
is a simple and natural reading. See Hodes [1984] for useful remarks on a similar reading
of hp and a quantificational way of proceeding.
29We’ll treat it as sufficient in the forgoing, taking the usual hedges as read.
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turning to its application to our project.
We treat denotations as (the graphs of) members of the type-hierarchy
over a domain. Given an isomorphism (really a bijection) i from a domain
D, we extend it to a function i+ on the type-hierarchy over D by “pushing
in” the bijection. For example, given a set γ of objects from D, i+(γ) =
{i(g) : g ∈ γ}. Standardly, an expression e is isomorphism invariant if, for
all domains D and bijections i from D, applying i+ to the denotation of e
on D is identical to the denotation of e on the range of i. Unfortunately,
any expression denoting a function from ℘(D) into D, such as #, will not
be isomorphism invariant on any domain containing more than one object
since we can simply permute its range for a counterexample.
But Woods [2014] argues that there are two relevant notions of invariance
for explicating logicality. One notion of invariance looks at the particular
denotation of an expression. In many cases, however, a domain does not
determine a single object as the denotation of an expression, but a range of
candidate objects of the particular semantical type. This range exhausts the
semantical function of the expression; for all we care, any of the particular
candidates could do the job. In such a case, it’s reasonable to look at the
invariance of the set of candidate objects.
When this set of candidate objects is invariant, then the semantical
function of the expression is independent of the underlying nature of the
objects in the domain and is thereby formal. This formality property is
what we wanted the notion of invariance to capture in the first place, so it’s
reasonable to treat expressions whose set of candidate objects is invariant
as thereby logical.30
Of course, we need to interpret this property for each of our two inter-
pretations of arbitrariness. On the epistemicist interpretation, arbitrarily
30See Woods [2014] for detailed argument. It would be nice for all isomorphism-invariant
abstraction operators to contain all candidate objects, but this fails. We could plausibly
add it in as another condition on logicality without damage to our view. Thanks to Sean
Ebels-Duggan for discussion.
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referring expressions denote a particular member of the candidate set of ob-
jects of the appropriate semantical type. We can define the relevant sense of
invariance for this interpretation of invariance—weak invariance—as follows:
An expression φ is weakly invariant just in case, for all do-
mains D,D′ and bijections i from D to D′, the set of candi-
date denotations φ∗ = {γ : γ is a candidate denotation for φ on
D} = i+(φ∗) = {γ: γ is a candidate denotation for φ on D′}.
Intuitively, this says that an expression is weakly invariant just in case, start-
ing with D candidate denotations, systematically replacing the objects in D
with corresponding objects in D′ gives you the D′ candidate denotations.
On the supervaluational view, we don’t assume that φ has a particular
object as its denotation on a domain; rather it directly denotes a range of
candidate objects which represents the semantical function of φ. On this
view:
An expression φ is weakly invariant just in case, for all domains
D,D′ and bijections i from D to D′, the denotation of φ on D
(φD) is such that i+(φD) = φD
′
.31
The difference between these two ways of describing weak invariance re-
sult from underlying metasemantical differences in understanding arbitrary
reference. Either way, weak invariance captures how arbitrarily referring
expressions can be independent of the underlying natures of objects in the
domain. Weak invariance is an extremely plausible and discriminating nec-
essary condition for logicality, allowing abstraction operators like #, inter-
preted such that no candidate denotation is excluded, a reasonable case for
being taken as logical.
31See Woods [2014] for more details.
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8 Advantages of Arbitrariness
Both approaches to referential arbitrariness solve the Caesar and the Raseac
problems, albeit in slightly different ways. On the epistemicist view, ‘#F
= Caesar’ is determinately true or false, yet we do not and cannot know
which one it is. Caesar may be the referent of ‘#F ’, but by referential
arbitrariness, none of Caesar’s properties, whether essential or not, plays a
part in fixing it as referent of ‘#F ’. There’s thus no point even in asking
whether Caesar really is the number 2. What is crucial is that, if Caesar is
indeed a member of a domain D over which hp is interpreted, Caesar can be
picked as the referent of the number-term ‘#F ’, thus just playing the role of
the number of the F s. Given that neither Caesar nor any other particular
object plays a role in specifying the denotation of ‘#F ’, there’s no threat to
the special epistemic status of hp.
On the supervaluational view, since Caesar is—or would be, were he
alive—a possible candidate to play the #F -role, ‘#F = Caesar’ is not de-
terminately false. Since many other objects could also play that role, it’s
also not determinately true. Besides retaining a close connection between
reference and truth at the expense of deviating from classical logic, the
supervaluational view claims mixed identity statements like ‘#F = Caesar’
resemble linguistic categorical mistakes—taking them to have a determinate
answer manifests misunderstanding of the theoretical role of ‘#F ’. Accord-
ingly, it and its cousins are removed from the range of statements which
should follow from hp.
The arbitrary interpretation also shows hp (and like principles) to be
logical or near enough. Operators like #, taken as operators of arbitrary
reference, are weakly invariant. Like ∃x, y(x 6= y), it’s not quite a logical
truth, since the domain might be finite, but it’s a truth entirely composed
out of logical materials.32
32Not all abstraction principles will have this status. Many of them involve non-logical
materials on their right-hand sides. Such principles typically induce non-logical operators,
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If there’s a sense in which the existence of infinitely many things is also
a logically-cum-epistemically privileged fact, then hp becomes an actual
logical truth. But this is unlikely since the potential infinitude of the universe
is plausibly a question of metaphysics, not logic. If finite universes are
possible, then alternative abstraction principles, like the so-called Nuisance
Principle,33 are true in these possibilities instead of hp.34
A word of caution. We are not suggesting that since the universe might
be finite, hp is a contingent truth—this is an open question. Rather, we
claim hp, arbitrarily interpreted, is a truth composed only of logical mate-
rials if the universe is infinite. If, contra the facts, the universe is finite, hp
would be a falsehood composed only of logical materials, and the Nuisance
Principle true instead. Of course, in light of this problem, there’s an open
and interesting question of what abstraction principles we could use if the
universe was finite. But that’s a question for another occasion.35
Both interpretations of arbitrariness have additional reasonable conse-
quences for the conceptual status of hp:
• On the epistemicist approach, what arithmetical consequences of hp
we can know are those common to any choice of referent for #.36
• On the supervaluational approach, the arithmetical consequences hp
actually entails about arithmetic are, again, those common to any
choice of referent. A bit of checking will show that on any reasonable
though it’s possible to still defend them as implicit definitions. We hope to address this
elsewhere.
33Wright’s Nuisance Principle [1997] is satisfiable only on finite domains.
34A referee suggests that contingency is problematic for hp’s privileged status as an
analytic or conceptual truth. But to us that this kind of conceptual truth is exactly what
implicit definitions that could fail should aspire to.
35On the view we defend, these metaphysical questions aren’t for abstraction principles
to answer. Desiderata (1)-(3) might be rephrased in order to allow different answers to
these metaphysical questions, but as we believe in ordinary mathematics, we won’t bother.
36Of course, by the usual limitative results, knowledge of hp doesn’t entail knowledge
of all arithmetical facts.
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domain, subject to the hedge of fn. 27, these are just the intrinsically
arithmetical properties.
In regards to Caesar, those don’t want there to be any possibility that
Caesar is 2 will prefer the supervaluational treatment; those content with
there being no epistemic justification for holding it might rest content with
the epistemic interpretation of arbitrary reference. As one might guess, we
differ on this point as well as other reasons for favoring our particular inter-
pretation of arbitrary reference. Nevertheless, we think both interpretations
generate useful and interesting views which deserve serious consideration.
Both views preserve the key structuralist insight that arithmetical prop-
erties hold independently of the nature of the objects playing the appropriate
structural role. The only content (or known content) given by #F is that
content determined by hp, so (known) arithmetical facts are typically in-
sensitive to the peculiar natures of the objects in a given domain; what’s
(knowably) true of the numbers are only those properties common to any
objects which could serve as indices for the cardinality partition.37
Our view avoids the problems for structuralism mooted above. Unlike
the in re structuralist, we treat the syntactic singular terms of mathematics
as semantic singular terms, vindicating the syntactic priority thesis.38
Unlike the ante rem structuralist, we treat all syntactically singular terms
of mathematics alike. We do not need to single out i for special treatment.
And, moreover, we avoid a commitment to substantial ontology, like a rich
domain of structures. Our view is ecumenical: it’s consistent with there
being self-subsistent structures, but also with there being no such things.
It’s also consistent with independently existing natural numbers which are
one among many structures which could play the number role, though again
we’d prefer to avoid commitment to such.39
37Fine [1998] also points out that an indeterminate account of mathematical objects
looks to be a promising and plausible way to capture key structuralist insights.
38Hodes’s [1984] logicism also rejects syntactic priority.
39Thanks to James Ladyman for discussion.
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9 Concluding Remarks
We’ve articulated our dissatisfaction with both standard structuralist and
neofregean positions. Our problems with each arise from their treatment of
singular terms like numerals: either they are taken to refer canonically—the
ante rem structuralist and the neofregean—or they’re contextually elimi-
nated (the in re structuralist and Hodes). Our goal has been to salvage
their inspirations: that principles like hp serve as conceptual analyses of
terms like ‘the number of’ (2); that typically the only (known) properties
of numbers are those which can be satisfied by any candidate structure
that could serve as the numbers (3); that the syntactically singular terms
of mathematics function as semantic singular terms (1). The way to do
this, we think, is to drop the idea that expressions like ‘the number of’ re-
fer canonically while maintaining that ‘#F ’ is a genuine, though arbitrary,
singular term.40
We went on to develop our view, structuralist neologicism, holding that
numeral expressions like ‘#F ’ refer genuinely though arbitrarily to objects
which could serve to play the role of numbers. We further argued that this
view delivers the key intuitions of neofregeanism:
• hp is a conceptual truth of some kind serving as an implicit definition
of cardinal number;
• syntactic priority
without abandoning the key structuralist intuition that the only (known)
features of the numbers are their structural relations to one another. Given
all the advantages of our view and the relatively minimal cost of accept-
ing expressions of arbitrary reference as genuine singular terms—something
40We haven’t argued explicitly that ‘#F ’ is a singular term in the philosophical sense,
though it’s worth remarking that it passes most of the tests for such and has the same
semantic type as a function of type e—once we allow indefinite members of that type in
the sense of Woods [2014]. This seems enough to claim singular termhood. We hope to
give a detailed argument elsewhere.
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which is strongly suggested by independent considerations anyway—there’s
good reason to take this view seriously.
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